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I. INTRODUCTION
Paraguay's Archive of Terror not only records General
Alfredo Stroessner's fear of political opponents, but it also
confirms accounts that Southern Cone countries such as
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay engaged in the
clandestine exchange of intelligence and prisoners from the mid-
1970s through the early 1980s. This secret scheme was known
as "Operation Condor." Certainly, the exchange of intelligence is
not per se inappropriate or illegal. However, Operation Condor
must be viewed in the larger context in which these military
governments ignored the due process rights of individuals and
targeted those who voiced opposition to them.
Evidence of Operation Condor has gradually come to light.
In 1999, Operation Condor received attention in the United
States when the Clinton Administration's Chile Declassification
Project released documents revealing that as early as 1976 the
United States government was aware of and expressed concerns
regarding at least one aspect of Operation Condor.! The work of
Spanish Judge Baltasar Garz6n in the cases against Chile's
General Augusto Pinochet has also increased knowledge of this
scheme.
While previous accounts of evidence contained in the Archive
of Terror regarding Operation Condor have not always portrayed
documents accurately, cited specific records, or relied on a




systematic review of the Archive, this article provides a
comprehensive review of the records in Paraguay's Archive of
Terror that demonstrate the secret exchange of intelligence and
prisoners. In doing so, this article provides additional evidence
to the developing picture of Operation Condor.
II. POLITICAL CONTEXT
From 1954 through 1989, General Alfredo Stroessner
("Stroessner") ruled Paraguay with an iron fist.3 Cold War
politics played a significant role during his authoritarian regime.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States gave considerable
financial aid to Paraguay. Paraguay was seen as a U.S. ally,
particularly in its opposition to communism. Stroessner used
the national security doctrine5 and the threat of communism as a
unifying theme.6 He freely labeled unsanctioned political activity
as communist.7 Stroessner relied upon the alleged communist
menace as a pretext for imposing many of his government's
repressive measures.'
Throughout his tenure, Stroessner imposed a state of siege
almost continuously without legal justification.9 Hundreds of so-
called "subversives" were arrested pursuant to laws entitled "In
Defense of Democracy" and "In Defense of Public Peace and
Liberty of Persons."0
3. See VIRGINIA M. BOUVIER, DECLINE OF THE DICTATOR: PARAGUAY AT A
CROSSROADS 4 (1988); INTL HUM. RTS. L. GROUP & COMrt DE IGLESIAS PARA AYUDAS DE
EMERGENCIA, PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TOWARDS THE RULE OF
LAW 1 (1996) [hereinafter PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS].
4. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 7-9; RIORDAN ROETT & RICHARD SCOTT SACKS,
PARAGUAY: THE PERSONALIST LEGACY 147-148 (1991); Andrew Nickson, The Overthrow of
the Stroessner Regime, 8 (no. 2) BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 185, 195 (1989).
5. See Paul C. Sondrol, The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay:
Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy, J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF.,
127, 131 (1992).
6. See Marcial Antonio Riquelme, Desde el stronismo hacia la transicidn a la
demoeracia: el papel del actor militar, in PARAGUAY EN TRANSICION 193-95 (Diego Abente
Brun ed., 1993); FATIMA YORE, LA DOMINACION STRONISTA: ORIGENES Y CONSOLIDACION
174-78, 188-90 (1992).
7. See CARLOS R. MIRANDA, THE STROESSNER ERA: AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN
PARAGUAY 70 (1990).
8. See id.
9. See OAS REPORT, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY,
OEA/ser. L/V/II.71, Doc. 19 rev. 1, at 21-22, 111 (Sept. 28, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 OAS
REPORT].
10. See generally MIRANDA, supra note 7, at 7-9.
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Real and perceived opponents of the Stroessner government
were detained without warrant, imprisoned without formal
charges lodged against them, never brought before a magistrate,
held without trial, tortured, "disappeared," and killed extra-
judicially." Many of those tortured were forced to sign
statements about their purported involvement in subversive
activities. Still others were compelled to leave the country or
placed in internal exile. 2 Many opposition parties were banned.
The judiciary lacked independence; judges were appointed and
could be dismissed by the executive branch. 4 Political, student,
union, and religious groups were closely monitored and
repressed." The government shut down a newspaper and a radio
station. 6 Elections were held but in name only. 7 Corruption was
widespread.'
Paraguay was not the only Latin American country that
justified the suppression of political opponents based on the
purported "Marxist" or "communist" threat. During the 1970s,
military regimes in many Latin American countries, including in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, responded to the
perceived communist menace by detaining, torturing, and
"disappearing" political opponents. 9 These countries created
Operation Condor to combat what they viewed as a pervasive and
imminent threat to their national interests.
11. See OAS REPORT, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY,
OEA/ser.L/V/II.43, Doc. 13 corr. 1, 86-87 (Jan. 31, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 OAS REPORT].
12. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 23.
13. See Jose Luis SIMON G., LA DICTADURA DE STROESSNER Y LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS 222, 240 (2d ed. 1992).
14. See DR. DAVID M. HELFELD & DR. WILLIAM L. WIPFLER, MBARATt: THE HIGHER
LAW OF PARAGUAY 86, 208, 211 (1980).
15. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 23; 1978 OAS REPORT, supra note 11, at 87.
16. See 1987 OAS REPORT, supra note 9, at 113.
17. See BOUVIER, supra note 3, at 15-16.
18. See Dionisio Borda, Empresariado y transici6n a la democracia en Paraguay, in
PARAGUAY EN TRANsIcION 88 (Diego Abente Brun ed., 1993); VICTOR-JACINTO FLEcHA &
CARLOS MARTINI, HISTORIA DE LA TRANSICEON: PASADO Y FUTURO DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN
EL PARAGUAY 27 (1994).
19. See generally ARGENTINA COMISION NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE
PERSONAS, NUNCA MS: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
DISAPPEARED (1986)(accounts of the political contexts and human rights abuses
committed during this period)[hereinafter NUNCA MAS]; 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E. Berryman trans.,
1993); SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA URUGUAY, URUGUAY NUNCA MAS (1989); TORTURE IN




III. OVERVIEW OF PARAGUAY'S ARCHIVE OF TERROR
A. Discovery Of The Archive Of Terror
In 1989, Stroessner was overthrown in a military coup
engineered by his brother-in-law, General Andr~s Rodriguez."
While this change in government and the introduction of
democratic rule represent significant developments in Paraguay,
Stroessner's Colorado Party continues to retain power. Indeed,
Paraguay's transition toward democratic rule has been an
unsteady one.
Unlike neighboring Chile or Argentina, Paraguay has not set
up a truth commission or other fact-finding task force to examine
the human rights abuses committed during the decades of
dictatorship. It has not prosecuted human rights abuses; rather,
that role has been left to human rights groups and individual
victims or their families. The government has made little
attempt to redress the human rights abuses perpetrated under
Stroessner.2" Nor was it the government that released records
from the Stroessner regime to the public.
Instead, it was the efforts of some courageous individuals
that brought Paraguay's Archive of Terror to light. In 1992,
Paraguayan attorney and educator Martin Almada filed a
petition for habeas data,2 pursuant to Article 135 of the 1992
Constitution, requesting information regarding his detention
during Stroessner's rule. 2 On December 22, 1992, Almada and
Judge Jose Agustin Fernandez proceeded to the police station in
Lambar6 (located just outside of Paraguay's capital in Asunci6n)
to request the habeas data.24 Initially, the police denied the
existence of such information.25 Ultimately, however, "the police
20. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 3.
21. See id. at 23-24, 52.
22. See R. Andrew Nickson, Paraguay's Archivo del Terror, LATIN AM. RES. REV.
125, 125-27.
23. "Everyone may have access to information and data available on himself or his
assets in official or private registries of a public nature.... He may request a competent
judge to order the updating, rectification, or destruction of these entries if they are wrong
or if they are illegitimately affecting his rights." Para. Const. art. 135 (1992).
24. See Rosa Palau, De "Archivo del Horror" a Centro de Documentacion para
Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, at 5-6 (Dec. 1993), (unpublished article, on file with
author); See Nickson, supra note 22, at 125-27.
25. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 10; Palau, supra note 24, at 6.
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allowed Almada and Judge Fern6.ndez to enter the station where
thousands of documents were stored."" Some of the records were
actually being buried. 7 Most of these documents were from the
political branch of the police department in the capital, known as
the Investigations Department.28  Judge Fern.ndez and his
colleague Judge Luis Marfa Benitez Riera understood the
significance of this discovery, as well as the potential danger
posed to the records.29 They ordered the documents to be
transferred to the courthouse in Asunci6n. These two judges,
reporters, and human rights activists formed a human chain to
move the documents from the police station to the courthouse. 3'
Additional confidential police records existed. Again, the
government did not voluntarily release them. On December 24,
1992, Judge Benitez learned of documents from the Direcci6n
Nacional de Asuntos Tdcnicos of the Ministry of the Interior ("La
Tcnica"). 2 La Tcnica was established during the second half of
the 1950s to combat communism, and was responsible for
political intelligence.33 The majority of the items recovered from
La T6cnica were so-called "subversive" books (approximately 700
volumes) confiscated from individuals, including Bibles and
writings of Lenin and Marx.34  Documents from the police
department's legal division, known as the Judicial Department,
were also recovered on January 21, 1993.35  All of these
documents were removed from police custody and are stored in
the courthouse in Asunci6n. They are collectively known as the
Archive of Terror or the Archive of Horror ("the Archive"). 6
26. PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 10.
27. See Palau, supra note 24, at 6.




32. See Palau, supra note 24, at 6.
33. See id. at 6-7.
34. See id. at 7.
35. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 11.
36. In 1993, additional police documents were identified in the town of Coronel
Oviedo, located in central Paraguay, as the result of a habeas data request.
Approximately ten to twelve files regarding the Agrarian League (a "campesino" group
which was subject to severe repression during the 1970s) consequently were released.




B. Overview Of The Archive's Contents
The Archive is comprised of more than half a million
documents created, collected, and maintained by various
divisions of the police and armed forces in Paraguay. The large
number of records and their detail demonstrate the degree of
control and oversight maintained by the Stroessner regime. The
Archive provides a unique opportunity to help understand the
methods of operation and mindset of the Stroessner regime.
Because police and military files from other Southern Cone
countries remain largely unavailable to the public, Paraguay's
Archive of Terror has become increasingly important.
For example, the Archive contains over 9,000 "fichas," or
cards, on which police recorded basic information about
suspected government opponents, such as a photograph, name,
address, date of birth, fingerprints, profession, supposed political
affiliation, and dates of detention. The fichas are the general
equivalent of police booking cards in the United States, but the
fichas also include information concerning the detainee's alleged
political activities.
The Archive has provided documentation of "disappeared"
individuals about whom the Stroessner government originally
denied having detained, including Rodolfo and Benjamin
Ramirez Villalba. These brothers were accused of having
participated in a plot to kill Stroessner." They were held in the
Investigations Department of the police." After Stroessner left
power, Julio Ramirez Villalba filed a criminal complaint on
behalf of his brothers. 9 Officials initially denied knowledge of
the detention, torture, and murder of the Ramirez brothers. ' °
However, documents in the Archive and testimony from fellow
prisoners undermined their positions." Other prisoners testified
that the Ramirez brothers were repeatedly tortured during a six-
month period.42 Luis Alberto Wagner, a former political prisoner
37. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 30.
38. See id. See also INT'L HUM. RTS. L. GROUP & COMIT DE IGLESIAS PARA AYUDAS
DE EMERGENCIA, TORTURA EN EL PARAGUAY: PASADO Y PRESENTE at 81(1993) [hereinafter
ToRTuRA].
39. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 31; See TORTURA, supra note 38.
40. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 31; See TORTURA, supra note 38,
at 20.
41. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 31.
42. See id. at 30.
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who served as a National Deputy after Stroessner left power,
testified that Stroessner himself told the Ramirez brothers that
they would be killed if they refused to admit that they were
plotting to assassinate Stroessner. 3 Wagner also witnessed the
brothers being removed from their cells at about midnight and
never saw them again."
The Archive also includes approximately 500 bound
notebooks compiled by the police. These volumes contain
thousands of pages of surveillance reports on known or suspected
communists and political opponents, reports from named and
unnamed civilian spies, signed and unsigned declarations from
detainees (many of which were reportedly obtained under
torture), and lists of political detainees. Surveillance reports
record the activities and whereabouts of suspected political
opponents who lived in Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil.
ANTELCO, the state run telephone company, provided the police
with time, duration, and recipient of telephone calls. The police
saved communist and "subversive" literature, books, political
pamphlets, and newsletters confiscated from Paraguayan
citizens. The Archive also contains lists of political party leaders
and their addresses.
IV. EVIDENCE OF OPERATION CONDOR IN THE
ARCHIVE OF TERROR
Documents in the Archive demonstrate that by
approximately 1974, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and
Uruguay had agreed to coordinate their efforts to exchange
information with one another in response to the communist
menace that they perceived had reached an international scale.
"Operation Condor" was the code name for this clandestine
scheme in which Southern Cone military governments exchanged
intelligence and prisoners during the mid-1970s through the
early 1980s.
Archive documents establish that in Paraguay, Operation
Condor was coordinated through the Second Division of the
Armed Forces ("ESMAGENFA"), which was headed by Benito
Guanes Serrano ("Guanes"). Guanes exchanged the intelligence
43. See id. at 30-31.
44. See id. at 31.
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he received with Pastor M. Coronel ("Coronel"), the Chief of the
Investigations Department, as well as with Francisco Britez
Borges ("Britez"), the Chief of Asunci6n's Police. After Stroessner
left power, Guanes, Coronel, and Britez were convicted of having
committed a range of human rights violations during this
period. 5 In addition, many intelligence reports were signed by or
addressed to Alejandro Fretes Davalos, who commanded
Paraguay's Armed Forces.
The following discussion is based on records contained in the
Archive. This information comes from police and military
intelligence sources. Thus, the Archive presents an interesting,
albeit one-sided, view of the political climate.
A. International Intelligence Conferences And Meetings
It is clear from the Archive that the military governments in
the Southern Cone coordinated their efforts in the so-called war
against subversion and communism. Discussion of international
coordination appears to have begun as early as 1973 or 1974
during intelligence conferences held among police and military
officials. These intelligence conferences were directed at fighting
subversion and reflect a pervasive fear of the perceived
communist threat. The intelligence services concluded that
because the communist threat had reached an international
scale, the governments had to coordinate their activities and
responses on a national, as well as an international level. The
bulk of the Archive's documents involving international
intelligence meetings span a ten-year period from approximately
1973 through 1982.
1. Multilateral Meetings
One of the earliest records in the Archive relating to
international cooperation is a report authored by Antonio
Campos Alfim, the Director of Paraguay's La T~cnica, and
appears to summarize what occurred at an international
conference in approximately 1973."' According to this report by
45. See id. at 24-40.
46. Direccion Nacional de Asuntos Tcnicos, Carpeta 73 (undated)[hereinafter
DNAT]. The first page of the three-page document was missing. It referred to an
2001]
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Campos, Paraguay accepted Brazil's offer to exchange
information through bilateral meetings and other methods with
members of the Latin American Anti-Communist Confederation
("CAL"). 47 Paraguay and Brazil agreed to coordinate methods of
security and protection." The Brazilian delegation privately
offered to provide Paraguay with comprehensive collaboration,
information, materials, and technical support. 9 According to the
document, Campos discussed the political situation in each
country and methods to combat subversion."0 At the close of this
conference, all ihe delegates affirmed that the time had come to
take offensive action against communism.5 ' Campos reported
that he had established valuable contacts for the direct exchange
of information and methods with the other delegations.52
In 1974, a number of international anti-communist
conferences were convened, including the Congress of CAL in Rio
de Janeiro and the Seventh Congress of the World Anti-
Communist League ("WACL") in Washington, DC.5 The most
significant of the conferences held that year was a meeting of the
Coordinating Council of the Anti-Communist Confederation. 4
The purpose of the meeting was to receive information and to
exchange experiences concerning Communists and pro-
Communists in order to adopt methods that could be applied
throughout the continent." It was important because one of its
main resolutions sought to establish a system to exchange
confidential information among member nations.56 Thus, this
meeting marked a more widespread exchange of information
upcoming World Anti-Communist League conference scheduled to begin at the end of
August 1973.
47. See id at 2.
48. See id.




53. See Memorandum from ia Policia Federal de Argentina, DPA 8 1973-77 W, No.
00013F 0298-99 (July 22, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 8]; Memorandum, Bibliorata 221
(1976)[hereinafter Bib. 2211.
54. Many of the documents in the Archive were found in bound, labeled volumes.
After they were "discovered," many of the records were bates stamped. Here, the citations
to records from the Archive include both cites, if they exist. In these notes, the first
reference is to the volume and the second is to the bate stamp number. See DPA 8, supra
note 53.




than had previously taken place. The Coordinating Council was
comprised of representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Cuban exiles."
In 1975, the number of high-level meetings among the
intelligence services appears to have increased. One of the initial
planning meetings of what apparently was to become Operation
Condor was held from May 30 through June 4, 1975."8 Guanes
traveled to Chile to help with the meeting of the chiefs of the
national intelligence services and the chiefs of communication in
the national intelligence services from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.59
From November 25 through December 1, 1975, a key
meeting was convened in Santiago, Chile."0 During this meeting,
many of the mechanisms through which Operation Condor might
operate were discussed."' A planning document for this First
Working Meeting of National Intelligence explained that
"subversion... recognizes no Borders or Countries, and the
infiltration penetrates all levels of National life."62 It discussed
how subversion had developed in the continent during the
preceding years and how subversion was contrary to the history,
philosophy, and religion of the continent.2 It continued that:
It is to confront this Psycho-political War we have
determined that we must count on the
International realm not with a Command
centralized in its internal action, but with efficient
Coordination that permits an opportune exchange
of information and experiences as well as a certain
level of personal knowledge between the Chiefs
responsible for Security.'
As a result of this meeting, a proposal was made to
57. See id.
58. See Informe No. 65 from El Comando en Jefe de la Nacion de Paraguay,
Bibliorata 245, No. 00021F 1558-59 (Oct. 22, 1975)[hereinafter Bib. 245]; GS CV.
59. See id. In October 1975, the Eighth Intelligence Conference of the American
Armies was held in Montevideo. See id.
60. See Primera Reunion de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional, Bibliorata 47, No.
00022F 0155-65 (Oct. 29, 1975)[hereinafter Bib. 47].
61. See id.





coordinate the exchange of information through an Office of
Coordination and Security. Further, a data bank, a centralized
archive with the backgrounds of individuals, organizations, and
activities "connected directly or indirectly with subversion,"
would be located in one country.6 5 It would generally be like
INTERPOL, but instead it would be dedicated to combating
subversion.6 A modern information center would allow access to
the data bank. 7 Working groups would evaluate and address
specific problems. 6  Under this proposal, all non-Marxist
countries would be allowed to join.6" Chile's National Intelligence
Directorate ("DINA") offered to house the data bank."
The Archive contains formal invitations to this meeting sent
by Colonel Manuel Contreras, the Director of DINA. Officials
from Paraguay's police department and armed forces, including
Coronel, Britez, and Guanes, were invited to attend.7'
2. Bilateral Conferences
The Archive reveals that Southern Cone countries frequently
held bilateral conferences between military intelligence services
in the 1970s through the early 1980s. Participants discussed the
status and activities of "subversive groups" as well as methods to
coordinate efforts against them.
For example, from 1974 through 1977, Paraguay and
Argentina held annual bilateral conferences.72 At the 1975
Bilateral Intelligence Conference between Paraguay and
Argentina, the Paraguayan Army presented its views of




69. See id. at 00022F 0159.
70. See id. The telephone and telex numbers of "Luis Gutierrez" were provided as
contact numbers. See id. at 00022F 0162. According to a conversation the author had
with Manuel Garret6n in Asunci6n in 1995, "Luis Gutierrez" was not a person but rather
was the code name for the Director of the Department of the Exterior of DINA.
71. See id. at 00022F 0152-53.
72. See generally Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia: Paraguay-Argentina,
Bibliorata 1008, No. 00046F 1344-1377 (1975)[hereinafter Bib. 1008]; Letter from
Guillermo Clebsch, Sub-jefe del Estado Mayor General (Asunci6n), to Francisco A. Britez
Borges, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), Bibliorata 246, No. 00021F 1692 (Sept.
5, 1997)[hereinafter Bib. 2461.
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subversion in South America." The Army concluded that for
many years subversion in Paraguay and other Latin American
countries had been considered merely an internal problem but
that was no longer the case.74 Paraguay therefore recommended
the direct exchange of information; the exchange of doctrine,
organization, and instruction; and the possibility of broadening
the bilateral nature of the Intelligence Conference to include
other countries. 5 It explained that the efficient coordination of
intelligence activities among the Paraguayan and Argentine
armed forces and national police was needed to deal with
subversives. 6 Paraguay noted that there were connections
among subversive groups in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and other countries.77  The Army was
particularly interested in the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria
("JCR"), which was comprised of members of the National
Liberation Movement ("MLN," Tupamaros from Uruguay),
Revolutionary Left Movement ("MIR," from Chile), and the
People's Revolutionary Army ("ERP," from Argentina)."8  It
understood that the purpose of the JCR was to make the
American continent socialist."
Beginning in the early 1970s through at least 1982,
Paraguay and Brazil convened annual bilateral conferences.
For the 1976 conference, Paraguay's police intelligence division
was asked to develop a presentation on internal subversive
activities and their connection with the exterior for the previous
year or so. In addition, the Paraguayan and Chilean armies held
bilateral conferences beginning in approximately 1975.8"
According to the program for the 1982 conference, topics included
73. See Bib. 1008, supra note 72, at 00046F 1376-77.
74. See id. at 00046F 1376.
75. See id. at 00046F 1377. At the September 1977 Argentine-Paraguayan Bilateral
Intelligence Conference held in Paraguay, Coronel was asked to discuss subversive
activities in Paraguay. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1692. In 1980, Guanes
participated in working meeting with the Argentine Army.
76. See Bib. 1008, supra note 72, at 00046F 1347.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 00046F 1347-55.
79. See id. at 00046F 1348.
80. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1650; Bib. 245, supra note 35, at 00021F
1553; Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policfa de la Capital
(Asunci6n), Bibliorata 147, 1-13 (1975)[hereinafter Bib. 147].
81. See generally Program from the Conferencia Bilateral de Inteligencia entre los
Ejercitos de Paraguay y Chile a Desarrollarse, DPA 6 D, No. 00019F 0855-0857 (July 25-
31, 1982)[hereinafter DPA 6 D].
20011
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the evolution of the subversive situation in Latin America overall
as well as in Paraguay and Chile.82
3. Advanced Intelligence Courses
From at least 1979 through 1982, Argentina's State
Intelligence Agency ("SIDE") held annual advanced intelligence
courses for high-level officials from "friendly countries."83
Although the names of these so-called "friendly countries" were
not identified, Paraguay was certainly one of them given the
numerous letters of invitation and course descriptions existing in
the Archive.' These training courses were designed to address
issues of intelligence and counter-intelligence, subversion and
terrorism, and methods of social communication."5
These courses also discussed the underlying ideologies of
subversives and sought to provide a comprehensive overview of
the situation. 6 They emphasized the importance of national
intelligence given the current climate of international terrorism.87
They cited the extent of the insidious ideological penetration.88
Argentine authorities believed that it was indispensable for the
security of the nations to develop this intelligence.89 They noted
82. See id.
83. See DPA 10 1979-80 E, 0001OF 0535.
84. See e.g. Series of letters from Francisco Alcibiades Britez B., Jefe de la Policfa de
la Capital (Ascunci6n), to Pastor Milciades Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de
Investigaciones de ]a Policia (Asunci6n), Bibliorata 81 No. 706, 963, 1771 (May-Dec.
1979)[hereinafter Bib. 81]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, No. 0001OF 0533; Letter from the
Secretaria de Inteligencia de Argentina to D. Benito Guanes Serrano, Jefe del II
Departamento del Estado Mayoral General de Paraguay, Bibliorata 173 (Sept. 18,
1979)[hereinafter Bib. 173]; Letter from el Ministro del Interior (Asunci6n) to Francisco A.
Britez, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), PQ 53 (Oct. 10, 1981)[hereinafter PQ
53]; Letter from Carlos Martinez to Guenes, Bibliorata 595, No. 00053F 0617 (May 19,
1981) [hereinafter Bib. 5951; Letter from Alejandro Fretes Davalos to Pastor M. Coronel,
Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1658; Letter from Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe del
Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), to Francisco A.
Brftez Borges, Jefe de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n) (Dec. 15, 1981), Informes from
Pastor M. Coronel to Fransisco A. Britez Borges, 1981 1984 F (Oct. 3, 1980)[hereinafter
Informes]; DPA 10 1979-80 E, 00010F 0532. See also J. Patrice McSherry, Analyzing
Operation Condor: A Covert Interamerican Structure, (March 16-19, 2000)(unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). McSherry contends that high-ranking Spanish officials
also attending these intelligence courses sponsored by the Argentines.
85. See Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0617; Bib. 173, supra note 84.
86. See generally DPA 10 1979-80 E, supra note 84, at 0001OF 0535.
87. See id. at 0001OF 0533.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 00010F 0533, 0535; Bib. 173, supra note 84.
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that it would be beneficial to exchange intelligence and to have
some personnel with knowledge of the regional, continental, and
worldwide situation.90  Paraguay's representatives to the
advanced courses were ordered to report to the Second Division
of the Armed Forces to receive instructions before attending.91
Scholarships were made available to some attendees. 2
B. Operation Condor's Extra-Legal Exchange Of
Political Prisoners
The Archive reveals several examples of suspected
subversives who were detained in one country and then secretly
transferred to the custody of another government's military or
police authority. These individuals were detained without
warrant, based on their political affiliations and activities. They
were transferred extra-judicially: without being brought before a
court of law, without legal representation, and without attention
to extradition treaties.
1. The Detention, Transfer, And Disappearance Of Nell,
Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, And Landi
The Archive's most clearly documented example of Operation
Condor's extra-judicial exchange of political prisoners is
illustrated by the fate of five individuals from Argentina and
Uruguay: Jos6 Nell ("Nell"), Jose Antonio Logoluso ("Loguloso"),
Dora Marta Landi Gil ("Landi"), Nelson Rodolfo Santana Scotto
("Santana"), and Gustavo Edison Insaurralde (or Inzauralde)
Meliar ("Insaurralde"). These individuals were detained by
Paraguayan officials without warrant; interrogated by
Paraguayan, Argentine, and Uruguayan military authorities;
never presented with formal charges; and then disappeared by
Argentine authorities.
Nell was a 69-year-old Argentine affiliated with the
Montoneros. 93 Both Insaurralde and Santana were Uruguayans
90. See Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0617.
91. See DPA 10 1979-80 E, supra note 84, at 0001OF 0532, 0534; Informes, supra
note 58; PQ 53, supra note 84.
92. See Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1658; Bib. 81, supra note 84.
93. Booking record No. 3845 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), No. 00017F
1308-11 (Mar. 29, 1977) [hereinafter 00017F].
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who belonged to the Student Workers Resistance ("ROE").94
Insaurralde purportedly was involved in other "subversive
organizations" and presumably served as a leader for the Party
for the Victory of the People ("PVP"). 9' Logoluso, an Argentine,
was described as an active member of the Peronist Youth
("Juventud Peronista).' Landi, also from Argentina, was
affiliated with the Peronist Youth. 7 All five arrived in Paraguay
in early 1977 on various dates. 8
Records in the Archive indicate that Paraguayan authorities
believed that Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, and Logoluso were
involved in a plan to arrange for political dissidents from
Argentina to obtain Paraguayan documents so that they could
leave the country and seek political asylum in the United
Nations' office in Brazil." The political dissidents would then
travel on to Europe.' 0 On March 29, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde,
Santana, Logoluso, and Landi were detained by Paraguayan
authorities. 0" All were held pursuant to what the documents in
the Archive refer to as a "superior order."1 °2 In a rare document
addressed directly to President Stroessner, Coronel reported that
these five individuals had been detained and described their
"scheme."' 3
The following week, from April 5-7, 1977, a working team
comprised of military intelligence officers from Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Argentina met in the Politica and Afines division
94. See Document from el Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la
Capital (Asunci6n), DPA 63 MOPOCO P, No. 00008F 1371-74, at 1374
(undated) [hereinafter DPA 63].
95. Letter from Alberto B. Cantero, Director de Policia y Afines, to Pastor M.
Coronel, Sr. Jefe del III Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital
(Asunci6n), DPA 2 ENE MAY 1977 A (Apr. 9, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 2].
96. See Booking record No. 3851 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), 00017F,
supra note 93, at 1320-22.
97. See Booking record No. 8850 from la Policia de la Capital (Asunciin), 00017F,
supra note 93, at 1317-19.
98. See id. at 1309-10, 1317-18, 1320; Documents from el Departamento de
Investigaciones de la Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), DPA 48 W, No. 00008F 1742-80, at
1744, 1746 (Mar. 29, 1977)[hereinafter DPA 48 W].
99. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1743-44; 00017F, supra note 93, at
1311.
100. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 0000SF 1743.
101. See 00017F, supra note 93, at 1309, 1318, 1321.
102. See id.
103. DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1742-45.
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("DPA") of the Investigations Department in Asunci6n. T This
division was responsible for overseeing internal security and
investigating subversion within Paraguay. Alberto Cantero
served as the director of the DPA. This working group was
comprised of high ranking military officials, including Guanes
and Galo Escobar, both of the Second Division of Paraguay's
Armed Forces; Jose Montenegro and Alejandro Stada from SIDE;
Carlos Calcagno of Uruguay's Army Intelligence Service; and
others."5  Each of the five detainees was meticulously





On May 16, 1977, Nell, Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, and
Landi were transferred to the custody of Argentine authorities,
again pursuant to what the records identify only as a "superior
order."11 7 Guanes and Captain Lazaro Sosa of Paraguay was
present when these five individuals were delivered to the custody
of two members of SIDE: Jos6 Montenegro and Juan Manuel
Berret.i 8 At 4:34 in the afternoon, an Argentine Naval airplane
piloted by Captain Jose Abdala left for Buenos Aires.109 Abdala
was an official from the Naval Mechanics School ("ESMA"), an
infamous clandestine torture center near Buenos Aires.' Nell,
Insaurralde, Santana, Logoluso, and Landi have not been heard
of since, and are presumed "disappeared.""'
2. Detention And Clandestine Transfer Of Three
Paraguayans
The case of three Paraguayans - Nercio Anastacio Stumps
("Stumps"), Sotelo Franco Benegas ("Franco"), and Lidia Ester
Cabrera ("Cabrera") - illustrates the clandestine detention and
transfer of political prisoners from Argentina to Paraguay.
According to a report by Francisco Ortiz Tellez ("Ortiz"), the
104. See DPA 2, supra note 95.
105. See id.
106. See id. See also DPA 63, supra note 94, at 00008F 1371-73.
107. Informe from Alberto Cantero to Pastor M. Coronel, DPA 1 1976-77 A (May 16,
1977)thereinafter DPA 1]; 00017F, supra note 69, at 1311, 1318-19.
108. See DPA 1.
109. See id.
110. See NUNCAMAS, supra note 19, at 130-31.




Paraguayan Consul stationed in Posadas, Argentina, to Sabino
Montanaro (Paraguay's Minister of the Interior), Stumps was
detained in Iguaz-i, Argentina, by Argentine authorities."'
During the night of January 18, 1977, Stumps, Franco, and
Cabrera were detained in a joint operation by the Argentine
National Gendarmerie and Argentine police in Misiones."' At
the same time, the Argentine officials confiscated Paraguayan
Communist Party ("PCP") propaganda from the detainees'
homes." 4 Ortiz reported that he spoke with the Assistant Chief
of Police of the Province, who indicated that the Headquarters of
the Military Area in Posadas (Argentina) would presumably
arrange for the "subversives" to be held pursuant to Argentina's
Executive Power."5
The next day, Ortiz again reported to Montanaro. He
confirmed that Stumps, Franco, and Cabrera had been detained
in Iguazil."5 They were held in the Military Unit in Posadas,
Argentina."7  Ortiz asked the Chief of the Military Intelligence
Service if an official from the Paraguayan Armed or Security
Forces could participate in the interrogations of these
detainees."' On May 5, 1978, Alberto Cantero wrote that
Stumps, Franco, and Cabrera were in custody and were sent
from the Political Division of Paraguay's Police to Emboscada."'
Emboscada was a detention center for political prisoners located
outside of Asunci6n. These individuals were never brought
before a judge and charges were never filed against them.
112. See Three letters from Francisco Ortiz Teller, Consul del Paraguay en Posadas,
Argentina, to el Ministro del Consulado del Paraguay en Posadas, Argentina, Bibliorata
600, No. 00053F 1527-29 (Jan. 20-21, 1977)[hereinafter Bib. 6001.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id. The Organization of American States (and others) concluded that Argentina
violated the rights of many by indiscriminately detaining individuals pursuant to the
National Executive Power. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., EL INFORME PROHIBIDO: INFORME
SoBRE LA SITU[A]cI(N DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ARGENTINA (1984) at 289-90.
116. See Bib. 600, supra note 112, at 0053F 1528.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Letter from Alberto Cantero to Jose Felix Grau, DPA 15 1978-80 W, 00013F
0380 (May 5, 1978).
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C. Potential Involvement Of INTERPOL In Operation
Condor
Records in the Archive further indicate that Operation
Condor may have subverted the purpose of the International
Criminal Police Commission, more commonly known as
INTERPOL.120 Notwithstanding the prohibition in INTERPOL's
Constitution against involvement in political crimes, INTERPOL
seems to have participated in the trading of intelligence
regarding political opponents of some governments on at least a
few occasions. A handful of INTERPOL documents in the
Archive seek and respond to requests for information regarding
the background of various individuals perceived to be political
opponents.
This exchange of information regarding the political
affiliation and backgrounds of certain individuals through
INTERPOL appears to have violated INTERPOL's Constitution.
According to the INTERPOL Constitution, its purpose is "(a) To
ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance
between the criminal police authorities within the limits of the
laws existing in different countries and in the spirit of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; [and] (b) To establish
and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the
prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes."" 1  In
addition, Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution specifies: "It is
strictly forbidden for the organization to undertake any
intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or
racial character.'
2 2
Moreover, the exchange of information regarding political
opponents of military regimes certainly was not "in the spirit of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Freedom of
expression and association are clearly protected under the
Universal Declaration."3  More specifically, Article 19 of the
120. INTERPOL is an international police force created in 1923 by police chiefs from
twenty different countries.
121. INTERPOL Constitution, Article 2.
122. In 1984, INTERPOL adopted a resolution allowing it to address issues of
terrorism. However, all incidents discussed in this article took place when INTERPOL's
Constitution prohibited involvement in politically motivated crimes, before that resolution
was adopted.
123. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/81O, at 71 (1948).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, including the
right to hold these opinions without interference and to impart
information without regard to frontiers.24 Under Article 2,
individuals are entitled to rights without regard to political
opinion.'25 Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that freedom of association shall be respected.126
Nevertheless, a few INTERPOL radiograms in the Archive relate
not to "ordinary law crimes" committed by individuals, as was
the proper domain of INTERPOL, but rather to the political
activities, views, and affiliations of certain individuals.
For example, in February 1979, Asunci6n's police chief
indicated in a confidential report that INTERPOL Buenos Aires
had been asked to provide background information regarding
Josd Tomas Salinas Pintos ("Salinas"), who had returned to
Paraguay to complete his military service.'27 Salinas purportedly
wanted to join the Cavalry's Presidential Escort Regiment for
better access to national dignitaries. Paraguayan authorities
expressed concern that Salinas may belong to unidentified
"subversive" Argentine groups."9 There is no indication that
Salinas was suspected of being involved in any "common crime."
Two radiograms to INTERPOL Asunci6n responded to its
prior requests for information.'2 ' In the first, dated March 10,
1980, INTERPOL Buenos Aires replied to a communication from
INTERPOL Asunci6n."' INTERPOL Asunci6n had forwarded
fingerprints and identification cards of several individuals to
INTERPOL Buenos Aires. In its response, INTERPOL Buenos




127. See Letter from el Jefe de Policia de la Capital (Asunci6n), DPA 47 W, No. 248
(Feb. 19, 1979)[hereinafter DPA 47 W].
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Radiogram from Domingo Galeano, Inspector General, Jefe del
Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0683 (Oct. 3,
1980)[hereinafter DPA 14]; Radiogram from Ysax Ruiz Diaz, Sub-Comisionario OP., Sub-
Jefe, Departamento INTERPOL, DPA 14 1977-82 W, No. 00048F 0669 (Jul. 13,





of two individuals. 33 It explained that according to the police,
Jorge Omar Lewinger was a member of the subversive Bolivian
National Liberation Army (ELN) and presumably had received
training in Cuba.' INTERPOL Buenos Aires also reported that
Jorge Alberto Ruiz was a member of the "subversive" ERP 9
Next, in a radiogram dated July 13, 1981, INTERPOL
Montevideo responded to another inquiry from INTERPOL
Asunci6n. INTERPOL Montevideo stated that Julio Cesar
Suarez Formolli was identified as a member of the MLN (an
Uruguayan guerilla group) and had been detained by the
Military Justice on July 22, 1972 for his "subversive activities."'
3 7
D. Sharing Information Regarding International
Subversive Activities
The exchange of information among the Southern Cone
countries regarding alleged subversives is further substantiated
by numerous reports to and from Paraguay's Second Division of
the Armed Forces, particularly during the period of 1974 through
1980. In many of the reports, instead of naming a particular
country, the distribution lists or sources of intelligence often refer
only to a "friendly country," "intelligence service of a friendly
country," or "security agency of a friendly country.""'
The Archive also contains a confidential distribution list that
identified some of the codes used in these confidential
intelligence reports, although this key does not directly clarify
which states were the "friendly countries."'39 That these codes
and veiled references were used rather than the actual names of
the countries involved invites speculation. Perhaps these codes
were used because the authorities sought to avoid public scrutiny




136. See DPA 14, supra note 130.
137. Id.
138. See DPA 7 1973-83 W; DPA 8 1973-77 W, 00013F 0340; DPA 5 Personal de ABC,
Hoy, Ultima Hora y de Radio Emisoras 1980-3 Q; Informe No. 025/78 from Alejandro
Fretes Davalos, DPA 6 D, supra note 55, at 00019F 1061 (May 23, 1978); DPA 47 W,
supra note 127; Archivador 109, 00040F 1245 (Feb. 10, 1978).
139. For example, this "key" shows that a "G" on a distribution list refers to specific
foreign military, aeronautic, and naval attach6s. Bib. 595, supra note 84, at 00053F 0719.
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Paraguayan authorities requested and received information
from Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayan
authorities regarding suspected subversives groups and
individuals who had been detained; they also sought to verify
intelligence they already possessed.4 ' Officials offered to support
and cooperate with other countries. They also exchanged
documents they seized.' Military attach6s of these countries,
especially Argentina, are frequently identified (by their
designated codes) as sources of information and on the
distribution lists for these confidential reports.
As an example, on November 22, 1974, Guanes circulated a
report to the junta of other governments discussing two guerilla
training camps located in Argentina and requested additional
intelligence regarding them.' In a report dated March 14, 1975,
distributed to the military attach6s of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, Guanes noted that
"extremist" Latin Americans were meeting in Argentina.' He
sought further details about the meeting.' Later that month,
Guanes circulated a confidential report to Argentine military
authorities explaining that Paraguayan authorities had been
unable to verify whether Paraguayan dissidents, including
Epifanio Mdndez Fleitas and Waldino Lovera, had met in
Clorinda, Argentina.'
140. See Letter from Guanes to Coronel, DPA 12 1976-83 WP, 00050F 1855 (Mar. 26,
1976); Letter from Alberto Cantero, DPA 29 ENE FEB 1981 A (Jan. 12, 1981).
141. In January 1977, the Argentine intelligence service intercepted a card from Dr.
Telmo Carrillo and turned it over to Paraguay's EMAGENFA. Letter from the Ministerio
de Interior to Fransisco Britez, DPA 1 DE (Oct. 21, 1976). In July 1978, ESMAGENFA
received information from Argentina's Armed Forces regarding the plans of various
Argentine subversive organizations based on documents confiscated from the Ejercito
Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), Partido Revolucionario de Trabajo (PRT), and Bands de
Delinquent Terrorists (BDT). See Letter from el Jefe de la Policia de la Capital
(Asunci6n), to Pastor M. Coronel, Jefe del Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policia
de la Capital (Asunci6n), Archivador 207, No. 00040F 1353-54 (July 15, 1978). In July
1979, Fretes reported on intelligence received from Uruguay's Defense Intelligence
Service (SID) regarding two individuals who had held a clandestine meeting of
Paraguayan Confederation of Workers (CPT) in Buenos Aires. According to SID, these
individuals were in touch with leftists in Uruguay and were going to participate in
international campaigns against "our countries." Uruguayan authorities wanted them
located. SID provided Paraguayan authorities with materials seized in Buenos Aires. See
Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1675.
142. See Bib. 595, supra note 56, at 00053F 0707.
143. Bib. 245, supra note 58, at 00021F 1435.
144. See id.
145. See id. Informe No. 16 at 00021F 1644 (Mar. 24, 1975).
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The Archive contains a series of reports written in October
1975, approximately one month before the meeting of the First
Working Meeting of National Intelligence held in Santiago that is
described above. A secret report dated October 20, 1975, based
on information from Brazilian and Argentine military sources
discussed the operations, organization, and plans of dissident
political groups.'46 Guanes concluded that these organizations
represented a threat.14  He emphasized the importance of
coordinating all the national intelligence resources through
meetings and the exchange of intelligence."4  Guanes
recommended that a commission evaluate intelligence for the
Commander-in-Chief. 149 He advocated devoting economic
resources for trips abroad to verify the intelligence held by
agencies of other countries.1 In another memo, sources from
Bolivia and the United States informed Paraguayan officials
about a "subversive" coordination center in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. 1'
This information was analyzed with Colonel Padilla of the
Bolivian Army during the 1975 Bilateral Intelligence meeting
held in Asunci6n."'
A report dated July 6, 1976, from Guanes is significant in
that its distribution list cites "Condor 1," the apparent code name
for Chile.' Paraguayan authorities, Argentine authorities, and
Argentina's Army Intelligence Service ("SIE") are also identified
on the circulation list.' Guanes asked for confirmation that a
military motorized patrol was searching for a guerrilla camp and
indicated that he wanted to coordinate efforts with the chief of
the military unit responsible for investigating the guerrilla
camp.155
Moreover, the Archive establishes that military officials
visited one another. On February 26, 1979, two officials from the
Argentine Intelligence Service, who oversaw the investigation of
146. See id. Informe No. 64 at 00021F 1578-81 (Oct. 20, 1975).
147. See id. 00021F 1580-81
148. See id. at 00021F 1581.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. Informe No. 65 at 00021F 1558-59 (Oct. 22, 1975).
152. See id. at 00021F 1558.
153. Id. Pedidio de Busqueda No. 23/76 at 00021F 1522. (Jul. 6, 1976). See Peter
Kornbluh, Chile Declassified, THE NATION 21, 23 (August 9/16, 1999).




Montonero activities, visited the Political Division of Paraguay's
Police Department 5 6  On July 10, 1980, Fretes and Guanes
reported on intelligence obtained during a visit from several
Argentine officials, including Orlando Ruiz of the Intelligence
Unit of the Naval Mechanics School, and two other intelligence
officers from Argentina's Chaco and Formosa provinces.5 ' Fretes
indicated that he had previously exchanged information with the
Argentine Intelligence Unit."8 Fretes requested authorization to
coordinate efforts with Argentina to identify and to follow two
Montoneros detained by Argentine officials.5
On November 6, 1978, Camilo Almada Sapriza and Lucilo
Benitez, from Paraguay's Investigations Department, reported on
their mission to Buenos Aires.16° They stated that they were well
received by Argentine authorities, especially the commanders of
the military attachment division and members of SIDE. 6 '
Almada and Benitez were allowed to interrogate members of the
Political Military Organization (OPM, a Paraguayan political
opposition group) who had been detained in Buenos Aires.16 2 It
should be noted that after Stroessner was deposed, Almada and
Benitez were convicted of having committed a range of human
rights abuses.'63
Brazil and Uruguay participated in the exchange of
information with Paraguay as well. The Archive contains a 1977
report discussing the background of certain Brazilian citizens. 164
The information contained in this report originated from Brazil's
National Information Service, ("SNI"). 165 A confidential map with
the stamp from the military attach6 of the Brazilian Embassy in
Paraguay shows the locations of various Brazilian, Paraguayan,
156. See Letter from Alberto Cantero to Pastor Milciades Coronel, DPA 12 Feb. Abr
1979 A. (Feb. 27, 1979).
157. See DPA 6 D, supra note 81, at 00019F 0876.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Letter from Almada and Benitez to Coronel, DPA 5 1978-81 B (Nov. 6, 1978).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See PARAGUAY: HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 24-40. In 1992, these two
individuals were sentenced to 25 years in prison for the murder of Mario Schaerer Prono.
See id. at 25. In 1994, Benftez was sentenced for his involvement in the detention and
torture of Amfilcar Maria Oviedo. See id. at 35. In 1995, Lucilo Benftez was convicted of
having tortured Alberto Alegre Portillo. See id. at 26.




and Argentine dissidents living in Paraguay."' As demonstrated
by several reports from 1981, Uruguay's intelligence service
provided Paraguayan authorities information regarding the
political affiliations of Uruguayans detained in Paraguay.'67 A
lengthy report from Uruguay's National Army (Dept. II)
discusses the history and operations of political opposition groups
in Uruguay."'
The Archive contains numerous lists of "subversives" from
Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, including organizational charts
of these groups. Some of these lists are extensive. For example,
the Archive holds lists of: Brazilian subversives living in
Argentina;'69 Argentine terrorists, including one with more than
one thousand names;7 ' Chileans, Brazilians, and Bolivians exiled
in missions;7' the Peronist Montonero Movement from
Argentina's SIDE;'7 Paraguayans detained and disappeared in
Argentina (including Augustin Goiburd and Federico Tatter, who
are believed to be victims of Operation Condor); 71 terrorist
Argentine criminals;'74  and Uruguayan "subversives" and
political opponents of the Uruguayan government, including
more than six hundred alleged Tupamaros wanted by the
Montevideo police. 71
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
More research is required to completely understand the true
extent and nature of Operation Condor in the Southern Cone
166. See Map of Paraguay, 1051 Caso Goiburu, No. 00050F 2474.
167. See DPA 10 1974-83 WV, 00048F 1706 (Jan. 2, 1981); Informe No. 004/85, DPA 6
D, supra note 81, at 0019F 0994 (Jan. 9, 1981); Bib. 595, supra note 84; Letter from
Cantero and Coronel, DPA 29 (Jan. 12, 1981); Informe (E.M.G.), DPA 11 1981-3 E (Aug.
10, 1981); Nota No. B/247, Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1672.
168. See DPA 48 W, supra note 98, at 00008F 1761. These groups included the
Anarchist Federation of Uruguay (FAU), the Student Worker Resistance (ROE), and
Popular Revolutionary Organization 33 (OPR 33, which allegedly had connections with
the Montoneros). See id.
169. See Nota No. B/650, Bib. 246, supra note 72, at 00021F 1653 (Aug. 6, 1976).
170. See Nomina de Terroristas Argentinos, DPA 1 1962-83 EW, No. 00051F 0382-83
(undated)[hereinafter DPA 1 1962-83 EW]; DPA 36.
171. See Documents from ]a Embajada del Uruguay en Paraguay-Agregatura
Militar, Bibliorata 7 INTERPOL, No. 00046F 0341-49 [hereinafter Bib. 7 INTERPOL].
172. See DPA 6 D, supra note 81, at 00019F 1015.
173. See DNAT, supra note 46, at Carpeta 30.
174. See id. at Carpeta 3.
175. See Bib. 7 INTERPOL, supra note 171, at 00046F 0341.
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countries, as well as the level of awareness and involvement of
the United States. Additional investigation of INTERPOL's role
in Operation Condor may also provide insight as to whether
INTERPOL routinely exceeded its mandate by exchanging
information regarding political crimes. In any case, it is evident
from Paraguay's Archive of Terror that the Southern Cone
military governments coordinated their efforts against the
perceived communist threat. The Archive provides concrete
evidence of the clandestine exchange of intelligence and prisoners
among the Southern Cone countries. Unfortunately,
compromising documents were likely removed from the Archive
of Terror before they were "discovered." The Archive of Terror
adds to the small but growing number of publicly available
records confirming the existence of Operation Condor.
